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Abstract
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care
not only about the level of provision of a public good, but also the number of consumers.
We show that on such domains strategy-proof and eÆcient social choice functions satis-
fying an outsider independence condition must be rigid in that they must always assign
a xed number of consumers, regardless of individual desires to participate. The xed
number depends on the attitudes of agents regarding group size { being small when con-
gestion eects dominate (individuals prefer to have fewer other consumers) and large
when cost sharing eects dominate (agents prefer to have more consumers). A hierar-
chical rule selects which consumers participate and a variation of a generalized median
rule to selects the level of the public good. Under heterogeneity in agents' views on the
optimal number of consumers, strategy-proof, eÆcient, and outsider independent social
choice functions are much more limited and in an important case must be dictatorial.
JEL classication numbers: D62, H23
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The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods under
Congestion and Crowding Preferences

Matthew O. Jackson Antonio Nicolo
1 Introduction
In classic studies of the strategy-proof provision of public goods, public good consumption
is assumed to occur without rivalry and without possibility of exclusion. That is, agents
do not care about how many other agents consume the good, and all members of the
society consume the public good. However, as Buchanan (1965) pointed out in his seminal
work on club goods, in many cases of interest agents do care about who else consumes
a public good and agents can be excluded from the use of the public good or else can
freely decide not to consume the good. Examples of such goods are abundant, including
for instance, public libraries, pools, and roads. In all of these cases agents prefer to have
less crowded public good use, but at the same time they may also prefer to have costs
of public facilities split among a larger pool of agents. Accounting for such preferences
over who consumes a public good is an important aspect of evaluating the performance
of mechanisms for the provision of public goods, especially for those goods whose use is
not compulsory or can be regulated.
While the study of pure public goods as well as club goods is quite extensive (see
Cornes and Sandler (1996)), the study of the strategy-proof provision is concentrated on
the case of pure public goods.
1
While the case of pure public goods is a useful starting
point, the prevalence of some aspects of congestion and exclusion makes it imperative
that the literature move beyond the case of pure public goods to understand the strategy-
proof provision of club goods as well. In this paper we study the provision of a club good;
that is, an excludable public good when agents care about the number of other agents
consuming the public good. We depart from the classic \single-peaked" pure public good

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1
See Barbera (2001) for an up-to-date discussion of some of the literature on strategy-proofness.
Some papers have considered exclusion as an incentive device (e.g., see Moulin (1994)), but none have
examined congestion eects when exclusion is possible. Given that Groves schemes have a very abstract
domain, one could use that framework to examine the issue (as we discuss below), but with some
important dierences from our analysis introduced by the transferable quasi-linear environment of the
Groves analysis.
model (e.g., Moulin (1980)) simply by allowing the group that consumes the public good
to be a choice variable, and allowing individuals to have preferences over the size of this
group.
In our model an allocation species a level of the public good (which might also be a
location or some other attribute), as well as the group of agents who consume the public
good. Agents have preferences over these allocation pairs. We focus on the case where
agents have classic single-peaked preferences over the public good level, and consider
several variations on how agents rank groups consuming the public good. One variation
is the case of pure congestion, where agents prefer to have fewer people consuming the
public good. This applies in situations where the distribution of any cost to producing the
public good is either already xed, or simply not an issue to begin with. Another variation
is the other extreme where individuals would rather have more individuals consuming the
public good. We refer to this as the case of pure cost-sharing, but it also includes some
other applications as we discuss below. Both of these may be thought of as extreme cases
of the more general setting where individuals have single-peaked preferences on group
size. For instance, in the case of a toll road both eects are present: agents would prefer
less congestion all else held equal, but also benet from larger usage as that lowers the
per capita cost or toll. In such situations agents may prefer an intermediate number of
consumers of the public good.
2
We characterize the strategy-proof and Pareto eÆcient social choice functions in these
dierent cases; sometimes using auxiliary conditions such as a condition of `outsider
independence' which requires that the allocation not be dependent on the preferences of
those not assigned to consume the good.
3
One fundamental result that emerges is that strategy-proof and eÆcient rules must
x the size of the group assigned to consume the good and not allow this to vary with
agents' preferences. In the case of pure congestion this amounts to assigning just one
agent to the facility, and in the case of pure cost-sharing it amounts to assigning all
agents to the public good; while in the general case where agents nd groups of size
k to be optimal it amounts to assigning groups of size k to the facility. This is true
despite the fact that there are many eÆcient allocations in these settings which dier
from such xed size rules. We show how varying size is incompatible with strategy-
proofness. These results also imply that strategy-proofness and Pareto eÆciency are
generally incompatible with an individual stability notion that requires that individuals
assigned to consume the public good weakly prefer consumption to abstinence, and those
not assigned to consume weakly prefer not to consume. In fact, the strategy-proof and
eÆcient rules can be incompatible with the weaker condition of individual rationality.
2
The various aspects that aect agents' preferences over who consumes the public good may have
to do with the actual consumption itself, or some arrangement about how payments are distributed
among those consuming or not consuming the good. In our analysis we abstract away from the specics
generating the preferences and simply work directly with preferences over the size of the group, even
though our labels may have some more specic connotations.
3
This may be thought of as a weak version of a non-bossiness condition, with a normative grounding
in self-determination.
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Another of the main results is that if there is heterogeneity in agents' preferences over
the optimal sized group, then only dictatorial rules satisfy strategy-proofness and Pareto
eÆciency and outsider independence.
While some of the results are negative, in several important cases (e.g., cost sharing)
there are still a variety of strategy-proof and Pareto eÆcient rules and the results provide
partial or full characterizations of these rules depending on the preference domain.
Relation to the Literature
While there is an extensive literature on the strategy-proof provision of public goods
4
,
ours is the rst analysis (that we are aware of) that deals with the characterization of
strategy-proof rules when the group assigned to consume the public good is something
that agents care about and can be varied. The closest paper in spirit is by Bogomolnaia
and Nicolo (1999) who consider a situation where agents have preferences that are single-
peaked over location and prefer less crowding for any xed location. However, they study
situations where two facilities must be located and each agent must be assigned exactly to
one of these facilities. Although there is a dimension of preference over who else consumes
at a particular location, the scope of those preferences, the applications, and the basic
structure of the problem and results dier. Here, we focus on the problem of locating a
single public good and where some group of agents must be chosen to participate, and
remaining agents do not participate. This setting results in fairly dramatic dierences in
the structuring of strategy-proof and eÆcient rules compared to the two facility setting,
and in fact stability is easily shown to be impossible in our setting while it is satised
in the setting with two facilities. Also a goal of our analysis is to move beyond the case
of congestion, and try to develop a general intuition for how preferences over number of
co-users matter.
Our paper is also related to Cantala (2000) who analyzes the provision of a public
good when agents can opt out of consumption. In his analysis, agents do not care about
the group that consumes the good, but do care about its location and have reservation
utilities. Since there are no congestion eects in Cantala's setting, the rules that Cantala
identies dier from ours and in particular allow the group that consumes the good to
vary in size. The comparison of our results to Cantala's work is thus useful in deciphering
the impact of congestion in the analysis. We shall see that congestion eects force us to
x the size of the group that consumes the good and force individual rationality to be
violated.
The incompatibility of strategy-proofness with Pareto eÆciency and individual ratio-
nality echoes a theme in the literature surrounding Groves' schemes (sometimes referred
to as Clarke-Groves-Vickrey mechanisms, see Clarke (1971), Groves (1973) and Vickrey
(1961)). There, strategy-proofness and an eÆcient level choice were incompatible with
4
See Barbera (2000) for some discussion of the literature.
3
balanced cost payments and individual rationality.
5
It is important to emphasize that the
nature of the incompatibilities, however, stems from quite dierent considerations and
the settings and issues are also varied on several dimensions. Let us be more specic.
First, in the Grovesian world, utility functions are quasi-linear and so Pareto eÆciency
ends up embodying a maximization of the sum of utility functions, and thus embodying
cardinal preferences. This means that in that world, the allocation functions which are
eÆcient are tightly dened and the incentive compatibility constraints that result are
quite strong as dierences in cardinal preferences must be uncovered. In our setting,
utility is not assumed to be transferable, and as a result there are many more allocation
functions which are Pareto eÆcient and so the incentive compatibility constraints are
weaker in the sense that only ordinal information needs to be discovered. Second, in the
Grovesian world a full domain of preferences is generally assumed, while here the pref-
erences are assumed to be single-peaked. This restriction to single-peaked preferences
provides an important reason why one might expect more positive results here, as it did
in Moulin (1980). Third, the incompatibility in the Groves setting holds even without
any congestive preferences or excludable nature of the public good, while here the fact
that agents care about how many others are consuming the good is essential to the re-
sults. Fourth, transfers are admitted in the Grovesian analysis, while here transfers are
not considered.
These dierences on at least four dimensions, makes the current analysis and what we
know from the Grovesian world hard to compare. The rst two points describe ways in
which the Grovesian analysis is more demanding, and the last two points describe ways
in which our analysis is more demanding. Despite all of these dierences, there is a basic
intuitive level on which we can understand the similarity in conclusions. In the Groves
setting, diÆculties with individual rationality (or even balance) when combined with
strategy-proofness and eÆcient decision making stem from the demands of uncovering
fairly rich preference information - essentially cardinal information - and making choices
that depend on that information. Here what we are seeing is also a strong demand
in terms of uncovering preference information - but it is in terms of how agents trade-
o public goods for congestion. Having such detailed knowledge of preferences would
be necessary to ensure voluntary participation, but turns out to be incompatible with
incentives.
The richness of preferences coming from the added dimension of congestion eects
is also the source of the contrast with the previous results on single-peaked domains.
There Pareto eÆcient mechanisms could be run with very little knowledge of the details
of agents preferences, beyond what their peaks are. In a sense, our results show how the
positive results on single-peaked domains (e.g., Moulin (1980)) were dependent on the
paucity of information about preferences that was needed to run the mechanisms (e.g.,
\peaks-only").
5
See Green and Laont (1977, 1979) and Laont and Maskin (1980) for details in domains including
public goods settings. Jackson (2001) provides an overview and some simple examples illustrating the
incompatibilities.
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As a nal remark before presenting the formal analysis, our model considers only
the provision of a single good. That is, we do not allow agents who are excluded from
consumption to form their own club and produce their own good. Our model ts cases
where the public good is unique. For example, consider the case of a natural resource,
like a natural park, when the agents have to decide the dimension of the area to be
protected and the number of people (per year) allowed to visit the park. Individuals'
preferences on the optimal number of visitors may depend from the tradeo between the
wish of preserving the natural environment, and the necessity of raising funds through
the entrance fees in order to nance the public project. Also, this concentration on
the provision of a single good allows us the most direct comparison to the literature
on the strategy-proof provision of pure public goods, such as the important analysis of
Moulin (1980). Nevertheless, there are cases outside of the scope of our model, such as
the provision of local public goods under congestion, that t well into the club goods
setting and where the optimal number of goods to be provided is a natural issue. As
such, our analysis should be viewed as a rst step towards a more general analysis of the
strategy-proof provision of club goods.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by providing basic denitions and out-
lining the preference domains we consider. Next, on these dierent domains we oer
characterizations of rules satisfying strategy-proofness in combination with various other
conditions such as Pareto eÆciency, outsider independence, individual rationality and
individual stability. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 Notation and Denitions
A Society and Allocations
A nite society of individuals, N = f 1; 2; : : : ; ng, chooses the location of a public
facility and a set of individuals to use the public facility.
An allocation is a pair (x; S) in A = [0; 1] 2
N
, where x 2 [0; 1] species the location
of the public facility and S  N species the set of individuals assigned to the facility.
Preferences
Agent i's preferences over allocations are represented by a generalized single-peaked
utility function u
i
: A! IR that satises the following properties:
(1) there exists an
b
x
i
2 [0; 1] (agent i's peak) such that for all x; y 2 [0; 1] ; if
b
x
i
 y > x
or x > y 
b
x
i
, then u
i
(y; S) > u
i
(x; S) for all S  N such that i 2 S,
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(2) u
i
(x; S) = u
i
(y; ;) for all (x; S) and y 2 [0; 1] such that i =2 S.
(3) u
i
(x; S) = u
i
(x; S
0
) if i 2 S \ S
0
and jSj = jS
0
j.
(4) 9 (x; S) 2 A such that u
i
(x; S) > u
i
(x; ;).
(5) u
i
is continuous.
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Without loss of generality, we normalize utility functions so that if i =2 S, then
u
i
(x; S) = 0. Note that it could be the case that u
i
(x; S) < 0 for some x 2 [0; 1] and for
some S  N with i 2 S:
Item (1) states that preferences are single-peaked in the level of public good, and
moreover that peak is independent of the group size. We talk about this independence
in more detail below. Item (2) states that i cares about dierences in the location of the
facility only if he or she is assigned to use the facility. Item (3) states that agents care
only about the number of people who are assigned to the facility, but not the identity of
the people in the group. Item (4) requires that there is some allocation that an agent
prefers to not participating, which ensures that the public facility is indeed a public
\good." Item (5) states that the preferences are continuous.
Given that the characterizations we obtain are very tight, the narrower the domain
of preferences the stronger the results. Thus, the uniformity of the peak across groups
(1) and the continuity (5) restrictions on preferences actually strengthen the results.
Extensions to expand the domains are straightforward, as one needs only check that the
stated rules in the results below remain strategy-proof and eÆcient when allowing for
variance of the peak and/or discontinuous preferences.
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The set of utility functions satisfying the above conditions and normalization is de-
noted U
i
.
Let p (u
i
) 2 [0; 1] denote agent i's peak under u
i
:
Proles, of utility functions are denoted u = (u
1
; : : : ; u
n
). We denote by (u^
i
; u
 i
)
the vector (u
1
; : : : ; u
i 1
; u^
i
; u
i+1
; : : : ; u
n
) : Let U = U
1
     U
n
be the set of proles of
generalized single-peaked utility functions.
In what follows, we consider several variations of sub-domains of preferences. Let us
discuss some of them now.
Congestion
6
Given that 2
N
is nite, this amounts to requiring that u
i
is continuous in x xing any S.
7
Of course, if one expands the domain too much, the results eventually become impossibility theorems,
as should be expected.
6
The rst subdomain of U
i
is where agents experience congestion. An agent prefers to
have fewer agents consume the public good. Let U
cong
i
denote the set of utility functions
u
i
2 U
i
satisfying the following condition:
(6) If i 2 S \ S
0
and jSj < jS
0
j, then u
i
(x; S) > u
i
(x; S
0
) for any x 2 [0; 1].
The corresponding subdomain of U is denoted U
cong
.
Cost-sharing
Another subdomain of U
i
of particular interest is one where agents prefer to have
larger groups consume the public good. Let U
shar
i
be the set of utility functions u
i
2 U
i
such that
(7) for all S; S
0
2

2
N

such that i 2 (S \ S
0
) ; if jSj > jS
0
j, then u
i
(x; S) > u
i
(x; S
0
)
for all x 2 [0; 1] :
The corresponding subdomain of U is denoted U
shar
.
Let us discuss some applications covered under the cost-sharing subdomain.
One possibility is that a group is building and locating a facility which provides a
public service or good. Here x represents the location of the facility and S the group
of users. The cost of the public facility is to be shared equally among the users of the
public facility. Here the only dierence from the classic (excludable) public good problem
is that individuals prefer to have more agents involved in order to lower their cost.
We remark that the preference domain U requires that the peaks be independent of
the size of the group consuming the public good. If instead, we consider a situation
where the level of congestion of the public good depends not only on the number of
consumers, but also on the size of the public good, then it could be that an individual's
peak varies with the number of agents consuming the good. We note that the closure of
that domain of preferences includes the domain of preferences considered here and that
the characterizations presented below in fact extend to that case.
8
Another application that is covered in this subdomain, but does not actually involve
any \costs" to the public good, is the following. Consider a group of nations which have
to reach an agreement on some common standard. Each country has dierent optimal
choice as to what standard should be involved, and no state can be obliged to subscribe
the agreement (for example on air pollution emissions). At the same time, the larger is
8
Such a domain would allow individual peaks to vary as a function of group size. The proofs we
provide do not require that peaks be independent of group size, and could be modied accordingly. As
our characterizations are tight on the smaller domain, they provide for stronger results and so we stick
with the smaller domain.
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the number of countries which reach the agreement, the greater is the welfare of each
country. Note that under this interpretation, individual rationality becomes a natural
condition to impose on the allocation.
This type of preference may also be generated also by private goods in presence
of a network eect. Consider for example the case of computer operating systems or
technological standards in communications. The utility of using a certain good depends
not only on its intrinsic characteristics, but also on the number of consumers of this
particular good. In this case our model ts the decision problem of companies which
want to merge and use the same technology, or nations that have to agree on the use of
the same technological standard in communications. In that case the public decision is
the choice of standard or technology.
\Size k" Preferences
The cases of congestion and cost-sharing can be thought of as opposite extremes of
situations where individuals have some preference over the number of individuals who
consume a public good. Intermediate cases, or cases where both eects are present are
also of interest.
Generally, let U
k
i
denote the set of preferences of agent i that stipulate groups of size
k 2 f1; : : : ; ng as the optimal size. That is, let U
k
i
be the set of utility functions u
i
2 U
i
such that
(8) for all S; S
0
2

2
N

such that i 2 (S \ S
0
) ; if k  jSj > jS
0
j or jS
0
j > jSj  k, then
u
i
(x; S) > u
i
(x; S
0
) for all x 2 [0; 1] :
Social Choice Functions and Properties
We provide the following denitions on the domain U . Corresponding denitions for
any subdomain are analogous.
A social choice function is a function f : U ! [0; 1]

2
N

:
It will often be useful to split a social choice function into its two component functions.
We write f(u) = (f
L
(u); f
G
(u)), where f
L
: U ! [0; 1] species the location or level of
the public good and f
G
: U ! 2
N
species the group consuming the public good.
Strategy-Proofness
A social choice function f is strategy-proof if u
i
(f (u))  u
i
(f (u^
i
; u
 i
)) for all u^
i
2 U
i
;
u 2 U , and i 2 N:
Pareto EÆciency
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An allocation (x; S) is Pareto eÆcient at u if there does not exist another allocation
(y; S
0
) 2 A such that for u
i
(y; S
0
)  u
i
(x; S) for all i with strict inequality for some i.
A social choice function is Pareto eÆcient if f (u) is Pareto eÆcient for all u 2 U .
Individual Rationality
An allocation (x; S) is individually rational at u if for all i 2 S; u
i
(x; S)  0:
A social choice function is individually rational if f (u) is individually rational at
every u 2 U .
Individual rationality requires that individuals who are assigned to consume the public
good, should be willing to participate in the public good consumption. The expression
here reects our normalization of non-participation to a utility of 0, and is equivalent to
stating that individuals who are called to participate, weakly prefer to participate.
Individual Stability
An allocation (x; S) is individually stable at u if u
i
(x; S)  0 for all i 2 S and
0  u
j
(x; fS [ jg) for all j =2 S.
A social choice function is individually stable if f (u) is individually stable for all
u 2 U .
Individual stability is a stronger condition than individual rationality. In addi-
tion to requiring that those who are participating weakly prefer participation to non-
participation, it also requires that those excluded from participating do not wish to
participate. As we shall see, this is not an easy condition to satisfy in conjunction with
strategy-proofness and Pareto eÆciency. It is however, a condition that can be satised
on its own and in conjunction with Pareto eÆciency.
Lemma 1 For any x 2 [0; 1], k 2 N , and u 2 U
k
, there exists S 2 2
N
such that (x; S) is
individually stable at u. Moreover, if k = n (cost sharing) then there is a maximal such
group (i.e., a superset of any other individually stable group).
9
The proof of the lemma is simple. For instance in the case of cost sharing it works
as follows. We order agents in non-decreasing order based on the minimum size group
needed before an agent would prefer to consume the public good. We then look for
the highest ordered agent for whom the number of agents up to him in the ordering is
at least as large as that agent's threshold number. That uniquely determines a largest
9
This unique super-group property also holds for any k < n at any u such that no more than k
individuals have u
i
(x; S)  0 when jSj = k and i 2 S. This is shown in the proof in the appendix. The
condition can fail at some other u 2 U
k
for any k < n, as Example 2 below shows.
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individually stable group. The largest such group is then easily seen to be Pareto eÆcient
subject to the choice of x. A careful choice of x then results in an eÆcient and individually
stable rule.
The following example shows that the uniqueness of the maximal sized individually
stable group only holds on the domain of cost sharing.
Example 2 Non-unique maximal size stable groups when k < n.
Fix some x and let each i have u
i
(x; S) > 0 if jSj = k and i 2 S, and u
i
(x; S) < 0
otherwise. If k > 1, then the set of individually stable groups is any group of size k
as well as the empty group. If k = 1 then the set of individually stable groups are the
singletons.
The next example shows that if we move to a domain where there is heterogeneous
preferences over group size then there may not exist any individually stable group.
Example 3 Non-existence of stable groups under heterogeneous size preferences.
Fix x and let n = 2. It will be clear that this extends to n > 2 and more general
preferences. Let u
1
(x; f1g) > 0 > u
1
(x; f1; 2g) and u
2
(x; f1; 2g) > 0 > u
2
(x; f2g).
Here f1g is not individually stable as then 2 would prefer to consume. f1; 2g is
also not individually stable as then 1 would prefer not to consume. Finally, f2g is not
individually stable as 2 would prefer not to consume alone.
Outsider Independence
In many cases we work with a condition that requires that a social choice function
should not be dependent on changes in preferences of individuals who are not consuming
the public good. This can be viewed as a weak version of a non-bossiness condition, and
is all that is needed in most of the characterizations and has an easy interpretation.
10
A social choice function f is outsider independent if for all i 2 N; u 2 U and u
0
i
2 U
i
,
if i =2 S and i =2 S
0
where (x; S) = f (u) and (x
0
; S
0
) = f (u
0
i
; u
 i
), then f (u) = f (u
0
i
; u
 i
).
Outsider independence requires that decisions regarding the public good be made by
those involved in the consumption. The condition rules out some social choice functions,
10
The stronger standard condition of non-bossiness is as follows. A social choice function f is non-
bossy if for all i 2 N; u 2 U and u
i
2 U
i
, u
i
(f(u)) = u
i
(f(u
i
; u
 i
)) implies u
j
(f(u)) = u
j
(f (u
i
; u
 i
)) for
all j 2 N . Outsider independence is the equivalent denition in our environment of a condition called
non-bossiness of excluded individuals by Deb and Razzolini (1999).
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but we argue that the rules that fail to satisfy outsider independence are less attractive
than the counterparts that are admitted. We provide some examples below.
While outsider independence is a reasonable condition, our use of it is largely driven by
its usefulness in the proofs of the characterization results. It may in fact be unnecessary
in some of the results, but we have not found a method around it.
3 Characterization Theorems
We begin by reminding the reader of the class of social choice functions that are strategy-
proof when agents do not care about the number of agents consuming the public good,
and all agents are assigned to consume.
11
This is the class of generalized median voting
rules identied by Moulin (1980).
For each C  N (including C = ;) choose a
C
2 [0; 1], such that a
C
 a
C
0
when
C  C
0
. Let
f
L
(u) = min
CN

max
i2C
[a
C
; p(u
i
)]

:
This is the full class of social choice functions that are strategy-proof and have a
connected range.
12
Sovereign Generalized Median Rules
There is a special class of generalized median rules that play an important role in our
characterizations. This is the class where a
C
2 f0; 1g for all C  N , and where a
N
= 0
and a
;
= 1. We call this class the sovereign generalized median rules.
This class has two special properties:
(i) it has a full range of public good levels, and
(ii) it always picks the peak of some agent.
It is easy to verify that this subclass is in fact characterized by these properties.
13
The sovereign generalized median rules include dictatorial rules (setting a
C
= 0 if the
dictator i is in C and a
C
= 1 otherwise), median voting rules (setting a
C
= 0 if C has
11
That is equivalent to the class of rules where f
G
(u) is xed to be N for all u and only f
L
is varied,
as then preferences over group size are irrelevant.
12
For a proof of this see Barbera and Jackson (1994). The class with arbitrary ranges is a variation
on this denition and is also discussed in Barbera and Jackson (1994). For more on the role of the range
and other interpretations of such generalized median rules see Barbera, Masso and Neme (1997).
13
This class of rules also plays an important role in the characterizations of Cantala (2000) who calls
them extreme minimax rules.
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at least half of the agents and a
C
= 1 otherwise), rules found according to other order
statistics of peaks, as well as a variety of other rules including ones that give special
consideration to some coalitions of agents.
An important subclass of generalized median rules that are not admitted in the
sovereign generalized median rules are those including (interior) \phantom voters," as
termed by Moulin (1980). We point out below why such phantom voting rules fail to
satisfy strategy-proofness and eÆciency on domains where agents have preferences over
the number of consumers.
3.1 The Cost-Sharing Domain
We begin by characterizing the strategy-proof social choice functions on the cost sharing
domain, since this is the most closely related domain to the classic domain where agents
do not care about the number of agents consuming the public good.
On the cost-sharing domain all agents prefer to have more agents consuming the good
rather than fewer and so the only dierence between this domain and the classic domain
is that it is possible that some agents might prefer not to participate. For instance,
consider a situation where two thirds of the agents have a peak at 0 and the remaining
agents have a peak at 1, and where agents prefer not to participate if the location is more
than 1/4 away from their peak, but prefer to participate at their peak no matter how
many others participate. Here, one might think that a reasonable allocation would be
to locate the public facility at 0 and then have the two thirds of the agents whose peaks
are at 0 participate. Even though this is a Pareto eÆcient allocation, it cannot be in the
range of a strategy-proof and eÆcient social choice function.
The following theorem shows that in fact any strategy-proof and eÆcient social choice
function must always assign the complete group to consume the public good, even if some
would prefer not to participate.
Theorem 4 A social choice function f : U
shar
! A is strategy-proof, Pareto eÆcient,
and outsider independent if and only if it always assigns the whole group to the facility
and selects the location via a sovereign generalized median rule.
The proof of Theorem 4 appears in the appendix.
It is not clear that outsider independence is needed in the characterization established
in Theorem 4. We have not found a proof without it nor an example showing that the
theorem fails with only strategy-proofness and Pareto eÆciency on the sharing domain.
As mentioned before, the sovereign generalized median rules do not include the rules
based on phantom voters where some phantom is in the interior. To get an idea of
why the phantom rules fail strategy-proofness and eÆciency in this setting, consider
12
n = 2 and a rule which selects the median of [p(u
1
); p(u
2
);
1
2
]. This rule is strategy-proof
and constrained Pareto eÆcient under the constraint that all agents be assigned to the
facility. However, it is not Pareto eÆcient. For instance, If p(u
1
) = 0 and p(u
2
) = 1 and
u
i
(
1
2
; f1; 2g) < 0, then both agents would be better o not participating! So, the only
sovereign rules that are strategy-proof and Pareto eÆcient on U
shar
with n = 2 are the
rule that picks the max of the peaks, the rule which picks the min of the peaks, and the
rules that are dictatorial. More generally, the theorem tells us that a strategy-proof and
Pareto eÆcient rule must pick some peak at every preference prole.
Given that all agents must be assigned to consume in any strategy-proof and eÆcient
social choice function on the cost sharing domain, it follows that there will be cases
where some agents would prefer not to consume and hence individually rationality will
be violated. This is easily seen by considering a preference prole where some agents
have a peak at 0 and are only happy to participate if the public good level is near 0 and
others have a peak at 1 and are only happy to participate if the public good level is near
1. Regardless of the level of public good chosen some agent will prefer not to participate.
This reasoning leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 5 There does not exist a social choice function f : U
shar
! A that is strategy-
proof, Pareto eÆcient, outsider independent, and individually rational; and thus there
is no strategy-proof, Pareto eÆcient, outsider independent, and individually stable social
choice function.
To get a better feeling for why there is no strategy-proof social choice function that
varies the group of participants, consider the following natural rule and let us see why it
is not strategy-proof even though it is Pareto eÆcient and individually stable.
Example 6 A Voluntary Participation Rule
Consider the following social choice function for the case of n = 2. (Similar examples
can be constructed for more agents.) With each x 2 [0; 1] associate the largest individ-
ually stable group at the chosen location. Such a group exists and is unique by Lemma
1. Let agent 1 pick from these allocations.
14;15
To see that such a rule is not strategy-proof, consider u 2 U
shar
where agents have
peaks p(u
1
) = 0, p(u
2
) = 1. Suppose that agent 1 prefers to participate with any sized
group and has preferences such that u
1
(x; S) > u
1
(x
0
; S
0
) whenever 1 2 S and jSj > jS
0
j.
14
Given the continuity of preferences, and the preference for larger sized groups, points of discontinuity
in the largest stable group have larger groups and so this is well-dened. For example, it may be that
f1; 2g is individually stable for all x 2 [a; b] and then f2g is stable on (b; c] and then ; is individually
stable on (c; 1]. This follows from the upper-hemicontinuity of the correspondence of individually stable
groups as x is varied.
15
Note that simply picking a peak according to some rule and then a largest individually stable group
at that peak is not Pareto eÆcient. For instance suppose that the choice is (p(u
1
); f1g), while at some
other x both agents wish to participate. It could be that both are better o with the second choice.
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So, agent 1 cares more about group size than location of the public good. Let agent 2
have preferences so that u
2
(x; S)  0 if and only if S = N and x 
2
3
. Then, under
truthful announcements by the agents the outcome is (
2
3
; f1; 2g). If agent 2 lies and
announces u
2
such that u
2
(x; S)  0 if and only if S = N and x 
3
4
, then the outcome
will be (
3
4
; f1; 2g). Agent 2 is better o announcing u
2
when his true preference is u
2
,
and so the rule is not strategy-proof.
An implication of Theorem 4 and Corollary 5 is that in order to have a strategy-proof
and Pareto eÆcient provision of the public good, there must be some enforcement of the
mechanism as individuals will not always wish to participate when they are called on
to do so. This is a property that carries over to any domain where agents have some
preference over group size, as we shall see below.
Before proceeding, we note that, excepting for the role of outsider independence,
Theorem 4 is tight. If one drops strategy-proofness, then rules such as the voluntary
participation rule in Example 6 satisfy eÆciency. If one drops Pareto eÆciency, then
other strategy-proof rules appear. For instance, one can x the group to be any S and
then run any generalized median rule to select the location (and the generalized median
rule could pay attention to individuals who are not in S).
To get a better feeling for the strategy-proof but ineÆcient rules, we conclude this
section with the following result which characterizes what happens when we replace
Pareto eÆciency with individual stability.
Theorem 7 If f : U
shar
! A is strategy-proof, outsider independent and individually
stable, then there exists a 2 [0; 1] such that for each u 2 U
shar
, f (u) = (a; S) where S is
individually stable at u relative to a.
Theorem 7 provides a dual to Theorem 4. Theorem 4 shows that strategy-proofness
and eÆciency require one to x the group of users (to be the entire set of agents) and
to perform a suitable general median voter rule to locate the facility. Theorem 7 shows
that strategy-proofness and individual stability (plus outsider independence) require us
to x the location of the facility and then choose an individually stable set of agents to
be the set of users.
The following examples provide some insights on Theorem 7. Example 8 claries the
role of outsider independence in Theorem 7.
Example 8 Role of Outsider Independence
Let S
x
(u) be the maximal sized individually stable group at u 2 U
shar
relative to
x. Dene f as follows. Let f (u) = (0; S
0
(u)) if u
2
2 U
shar
2
is such that p (u
2
) =
1
2
and
u
2
(x; S)  0 only if x 2
h
1
3
;
2
3
i
;
16
and let f (u) = (1; S
1
(u)) ; otherwise. This rule violates
16
Note that agent 2 =2 S
0
(u) :
14
outsider independence, but it is strategy-proof and individually stable. According to this
rule the facility is not always located at the same place.
The next example shows why the converse to Theorem 7 requires one to be careful
in selecting the group.
Example 9 Selection of the stable group
Let N = f1; 2g. Consider the following rule. For all u 2 U
shar
let f (u) =

1
2
; S
min
1
2

where S
min
1
2
is a stable group with the minimum cardinality at
1
2
: This rule is outsider
independent and individually stable, but not strategy-proof. To see this, consider a prole
u 2 U
shar
such that u
i

1
2
; fig

< 0 and u
i

1
2
; f1; 2g

> 0 for both i = 1; 2. It follows that
f (u) =

1
2
; ;

. Let u^
1
2 U
shar
1
be such that u^
1

1
2
; f1g

> 0: Individual stability implies
that f (u^
1
; u
2
) =

1
2
; f1; 2g

; but then strategy-proofness is violated at u by agent 1 via
u^
1
.
The previous example suggests that failing to pick the largest individually stable group
may result in a violation of strategy-proofness. It is easily seen that always selecting the
largest individually stable group at a xed location will result in a strategy-proof rule.
However, there are also some
other strategy-proof (outsider independent and individually stable) rules, as the nal
example of this section shows.
Example 10 Selection of the stable group II
Let N = f1; 2; 3g. Consider the following rule. For all u 2 U
shar
let f
L
(u) = a and
f
G
(u) is the largest individually stable group for which all agents have strictly positive
utility in being assigned to the facility. Consider, for example, utility prole u 2 U
shar
such that u
3
(a;N) = 0 and u
3
(a; S) < 0 for all S 6= N; while u
i
(a; fig) > 0 for both
i = 1; 2. It follows that f (u) = (a; f1; 2g), while the largest stable group at a is N .
This rule is outsider independent, individually stable, and strategy-proof, even though
it does not always select the largest stable group at the given location.
17
3.2 The Pure Congestion Domain
We now turn to the other extreme domain of pure congestion, where agents all prefer to
have smaller groups consume the public good.
17
It is easy to show, however, that the freedom to vary the selection of the stable group is limited. In
cases where all agents in the largest stable group at some given location get strictly positive utility from
being in the largest stable group at that location, then the rule must pick the largest stable group. This
is true regardless of how the location is chosen.
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The basic intuition that there will be problems in varying the group size in a strategy-
proof rule carries over to this case. However, in the case of congestion this suggests that
the group size should be just 1, and hence we end up with only dictatorial rules. This is
stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 11 A social choice function f : U
cong
! A is strategy-proof, Pareto eÆcient,
and outsider independent if and only if it is dictatorial.
18
Theorem 11 does require outsider independence. If outsider independence is dropped,
then some non-dictatorial rules emerge. For instance, in a three agent economy one can
nd a strategy-proof rule where either agent 1 dictates or agent 2 dictates, depending in
some arbitrary way on the announcement of preferences by agent 3. While we have not
been able to nd a proof, we conjecture that the only new rules admitted by dropping
outsider independence amount to some variation on picking a dictator in a way that
depends on outsiders' preferences.
The characterization is tight. If one drops Pareto eÆciency, then xing any group S
and running a generalized median rule on that group to choose the location results in
a strategy-proof and outsider independent social choice function. If one drops strategy-
proofness then, for example, one admits rules of the following form. If both agents 1 and
2 have u
i
(p(u
1
); f1; 2g) > 0 then let the outcome be (p(u
1
); f1; 2g), and otherwise let the
outcome be (p(u
n
); fng). As the set of eÆcient allocations is quite large, there are many
Pareto eÆcient and outsider independent rules that are not strategy-proof.
3.3 The Domain of a Common Optimal Group Size k
We now turn to the more general case where both congestion and cost sharing eects
may be present. As in the above extreme cases, strategy-proof, eÆcient and outsider
independent rules cannot vary the group size. The full characterization of all such rules
is complex and tedious, so we oer a partial characterization that captures most of the
properties of the rules.
Theorem 12 Fix k 2 f1; : : : ; ng. If a social choice function f : U
k
! A is strategy-
proof, Pareto eÆcient, and outsider independent, then it always assigns a group of size k
to use the facility, the level of public good selected depends only on the peaks of the agents
over levels, and at least one agent whose peak coincides with the level of the public good
is included in the group of assigned consumers.
The theorem stops short of providing a complete characterization as it leaves partly
open how the rules select among the peaks and how agents are assigned to the facility.
A bit more can be seen fairly easily, as the fact that the peak selection must always
18
There exists i such that f(u) = (p
i
(u
i
); fig) for all u 2 U
cong
.
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be a peak of an agent assigned to the facility together with the properties of strategy-
proofness, eÆciency, and outsider independence implies that the level is chosen according
to a sovereign generalized median rule which depends only on the peaks of the agents
who always may be assigned to consume if they so desire (and some such agents exist).
However, a full characterization involves a system by which assignment of the group to use
the facility can follow fairly complicated priority rules. To get a feeling for the complexity
of the rules that can satisfy the above conditions, consider the following example.
Example 13 Group Selection
The level of the public good is the minimum of agent 1 and agent 2's peaks. The
n > k > 1 agents assigned to consume are chosen as follows. If agent 1's peak is the
minimum, then select the rst k agents who have positive utility for being assigned to
the facility (in a group of size k) by the following priority rule: 1; 2; 3; :::; n. If there are
less than k agents with positive utility, select the remaining agents to be forced in the
group by the following priority rule: n; n   1; :::; 2: If agent 2's peak is the lowest then
select the rst k agents who have positive utility in being assigned to the group by the
following priority rule 2; 1; n; n  1; :::; 3: If there are less than k agents select the agents
to be forced in the group by the same priority rule.
Finally note that individual stability is a diÆcult condition to satisfy in conjunction
with strategy-proofness. A direct corollary to Theorem 12 is that there does not exist
any social choice function f : U
k
! A that is strategy-proof, Pareto eÆcient, outsider
independent, and individually stable.
19
The following stronger result is, in fact, true.
Theorem 14 If k < n, then there does not exist any social choice function f : U
k
! A
that is strategy-proof and individually stable.
Note that Theorem 14 uses very little of the structure of the preference domain. It
holds even if all agents have identical known peaks and we x the location to be that
peak. It results entirely from the selection of the group and agents preferences over group
sizes versus non-participation.
20
3.4 Heterogeneous Most Preferred Group Sizes
Theorem 12 only applies to situations where all agents have exactly the same optimal
group size in mind. In many applications, it may be that agents disagree about the
optimal group size, and their preferences over the optimal group size may not always be
constant.
19
As with k = n, if k > 1 one can show that in fact individual rationality must be violated.
20
A similar result is noted in Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) in a pure coalition formation setting.
17
What we show in the theorem below is that even a small expansion of the preference
domain to allow for some variance in optimal group size leads to a very negative conclu-
sion. The small expansion in the domain is simply to allowing an agent's favorite group
size to take on more than one value.
Let U
k;k
0
= 
i
(U
k
i
[ U
k
0
i
). This is a domain where agents' favorite sized groups may
take on more than one value.
Theorem 15 Consider any group sizes k and k
0
with k 6= k
0
. If a social choice function
f : U
k;k
0
! [0; 1] 2
N
is strategy-proof, Pareto eÆcient, and outsider independent, then
it is dictatorial.
21
Theorem 15 does not provide a full characterization as we have not specied exactly
how the group is selected and only certain methods of selecting the group are compatible
with strategy-proofness. But in this case, a strategy-proof rule must identify a single
agent i, locate the public good at that agent's peak, choose a group that includes i and
is of i's optimal size. The only thing that we have left unspecied in the characterization
is the exact selection of the group, which again can follow a hierarchical priority system
(as in Example 13).
22
4 Discussion
When the number of consumers of a public good is an important aspect of agents' prefer-
ences, strategy-proofness, eÆciency and individual stability are not compatible. In order
for strategy-proofness, eÆciency, and outsider independence to be satised, some agents
must be either forced to consume the public good, or excluded from its usage. Thus, one
of the implications of the results here is that in order to implement a strategy-proof and
eÆcient social choice rule we do need a \planner" who has some coercive power over the
set of possible consumers of the public good. It follows that for the provision of public
goods when the size of the group of users matters, there must exist a real enforcing
authority and not
just a virtual organization among its members.
Another thing to note about the results is that anonymity is naturally precluded, since
even when all agents have the same preferences some group of size k must be selected.
This is partly due to our approach which only considers determinate groups of consumers
as outcomes. It may be of interest to study partial exclusion and/or randomization in
settings where some congestion is present.
21
A social choice function is dictatorial if there exists i 2 N such that the outcome is always i's most
preferred level and group size, with i in the group.
22
To get a feeling for how such priority systems can work in the face of strategy-proofness, see Barbera,
Jackson and Neme (1997) who outline priority systems in allotment rules or Papai (2000) who outlines
hierarchies in an allocation problem.
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Theorem 15 is somewhat pessimistic as it shows that allowing for exibility in size
will be incompatible with strategy-proofness unless one cares for dictatorial rules. Thus,
eÆciency and strategy-proofness are somewhat at odds here. However, if one allows for
approximate eÆciency, and for instance considers large economies where the distribution
over preferences for group size is known, then xing a group size may not be far from
eÆcient, and would allow a variety of non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, and approximately
eÆcient rules to be available.
We have focused on the provision of a single good. Studying the strategy-proof provi-
sion of more than one public good and possibly with side payments, but with preferences
on group size, is an important area for future study. This is especially true, given that
our results showing that the size of groups must be xed. In cases where the preferred
size k is smaller than n, it is natural to think of producing several local public goods.
This would involve bringing together approaches such as that here with those as in Bogo-
molnaia and Nicolo (1999) and Le Breton and Weber (2001), among others in the more
general Tiebout and club goods literatures.
As one nal note, the characterizations we have obtained here hold under even stricter
domains of preferences. For instance, the proofs in the appendix all hold if we add a
condition: u
i
(x; S) > u
i
(y; S) if and only if u
i
(x; S
0
) > u
i
(y; S
0
) whenever i 2 S \ S
0
.
This makes the results stronger as it implies that the characterizations are tight even
with a separability in utility between x and S.
19
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6 Appendix
For any i and k, let U
k+
i
denote the subdomain of U
k
i
such that u
i
(x; S) > 0 for all (x; S)
such that i 2 S.
Proof of Lemma 1: Fix any location choice x 2 [0; 1] and some k 2 N and u 2 U
k
.
Let us rst show that there always exists a choice of an S for which (x; S) is individually
stable at u.
Case 1: No more than k individuals have u
i
(x; S)  0 when jSj = k and i 2 S.
Let m
i
be such that u
i
(x; S)  0 when jSj = m
i
and i 2 S, but u
i
(x; S) < 0 when
jSj < m
i
and i 2 S. (Set m
i
= n + 1 if u
i
(x; S) < 0 for all S with i 2 S and m
i
= 1
if u
i
(x; S)  0 for all S such that i 2 S.) So, m
i
is the minimal sized group that i is
willing to be a member of at x. Note m
i
is uniquely determined under the preference
assumptions. Order the agents in terms of m
i
. In particular, without loss of generality
assume that m
n
 m
n 1
     m
1
. Find the largest i such that i  m
i
. If there is no
such i, then clearly the empty group is individually stable. Otherwise, it follows directly
that f1; : : : ; ig is individually stable.
Case 2: More than k individuals have u
i
(x; S)  0 when jSj = k and i 2 S.
Let M
i
be such that u
i
(x; S)  0 when jSj = M
i
and i 2 S, but u
i
(x; S) < 0 when
jSj > M
i
and i 2 S. (Set M
i
= 0 if u
i
(x; S) < 0 for all S with i 2 S.) So, M
i
is the
maximal sized group that i is willing to be a member of at x. Again, M
i
is uniquely
determined under the preference assumptions. Without loss of generality assume that
agents are labeled so that M
1
 M
2
     M
n
. If n  M
n
, then the group N is
individually stable. Otherwise, nd i such that i  M
i
but i + 1 > M
i+1
and then
f1; : : : ; ig is clearly individually stable. Note that i is uniquely determined under our
ordering of agents, and that i  k by the denition of this case.
To complete the proof let us show that when k = n then there is an individually
stable group that includes all other individually stable groups. First note that when
k = n we must always fall in case 1. Suppose that the empty group is selected under
the algorithm in case 1. Then it is clear from the denition of the m
i
's that no other
group is individually stable. Next, consider the case where some f1; : : : ; ig is the group
selected by the algorithm in case 1. Suppose that some other S is individually stable
where j 2 S for some j > i. Let j be the largest indexed individual in S. It must be that
jSj  m
j
by individual stability and the denition of m
j
. By our ordering m
j
 m
h
for
22
any h < j. Thus, by the preferences it must be that h < j strictly prefers to be in S if
h =2 S, and so by individual stability h 2 S for all h < j. Thus, f1; : : : ; jg = S. However,
then j = jSj  m
j
which contradicts that fact that i < j was the largest indexed agent
for whom i  m
i
.
The following Lemmas are useful in the remaining proofs.
For any u
 i
and any k
O
k
i
(u
 i
) = f(x; S)j(x; S) = f(u
i
; u
 i
) for some u
i
2 U
k
i
g:
So, O
k
i
(u
 i
) is the option set of i; that is, the set of outcomes that i can generate xing
the prole of preferences of the other agents. Note that strategy-proofness implies that
for each u 2 U
k
and for all i 2 N;
f(u) 2 argmax
(x;S)2O
k
i
(u
 i
)
u
i
(x; S):
For any x 2 [0; 1], let I (x) denote a. When we refer to a specic agent i 2 N , we
write I
i
(x). Finally let S
k
denote any group of agents with cardinality k:
Lemma 16 Let f : U
k
! [0; 1]  2
N
be strategy-proof, and consider any u 2 U
k
and
let (a; Y ) = f (u). For each i 2 Y there exists a closed set with non-empty interior
containing a, I  [0; 1], such that for any closed neighborhood of a with non-empty
interior I
i
(a)  I, then there exists u
0
i
2 U
k
i
such that
 p (u
0
i
) = a;
 u
0
i
(a; Y ) > 0 and u
0
i
(x; S) < 0 for all x =2 I (a) and for all S such that i 2 S;
 f (u
0
i
; u
 i
) = (a; S) with jSj = jY j and i 2 S:
Proof of Lemma 16: If jY j = k, then the Lemma follows directly. So consider the
case where k
0
= jY j > k (k
0
= jY j < k). By strategy-proofness and the conditions on
preferences, it must be that (a; S) =2 O
k
i
(u
 i
) for any S such that i 2 S and k
0
> jSj  k
(k
0
< jSj  k). In fact, by the continuity of preferences and strategy-proofness it follows
that there exists some  > 0 such that (b; S) =2 O
k
i
(u
 i
) for any S such that i 2 S and
k
0
> jSj  k (k
0
< jSj  k) ; and any b such that jb  aj < .
Select u
0
i
2 U
k
i
such that p(u
0
i
) = a and u
0
i
(x; S)  0 only if x 2 I
i
(a) and i 2 S, with
u
i
(a; S) > 0 whenever i 2 S, and the length of I
i
(a) is less than

2
.
Since (b; S) =2 O
k
i
(u
 i
) for any S such that i 2 S and k
0
> jSj  k (k
0
< jSj  k)
and any b such that jb  aj < , it follows that the most preferred alternative in O
k
i
(u
 i
)
under u
0
i
is (a; Y ) or any (a; S) with jSj = jY j. The lemma follows directly.
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Lemma 17 Consider a strategy-proof and outsider independent f dened on U
k
for some
k, and consider u 2 U
k
, letting f (u) = (a; Y ). For all i =2 Y; there exists u
0
i
2 U
k
i
with
p (u
0
i
) 6= a such that f

u
0
 Y
; u
Y

= (a; Y ) and p

u
0
j

6= p (u
0
h
) for each j =2 Y and h 6= j.
Proof of Lemma 17: Let f (u) = (a; Y ). Consider any j =2 Y . Suppose that either
p (u
j
) = a or p (u
j
) = p (u
h
) for some other agent h 2 N . By continuity of the utility
functions, for each j =2 Y there exists a closed interval with non-empty interior
23
I
j
(p (u
j
))
such that u
j
(x; S)  0 for all x 2 I
j
(p (u
j
)) and S such that j 2 S and jSj = k. Let
u
0
j
2 U
k
j
be such that p(u
0
j
) 2 I
j
(p (u
j
)) ; p(u
0
j
) 6= p(u
h
) for any h 2 N; and u
0
j
(x; S)  0
only if jSj = k and x 2 I
0
j
(p (u
j
))  I
j
(p (u
j
)). Then by strategy-proofness and outsider
independence f

u
0
j
; u
 j

= (a; Y ) : Repeat the argument for all j =2 Y; choosing at u
0
j
a
dierent peak for each agent j.
Proof of Theorem 4: Theorem 12, which is proven below, implies that the whole
group must always be assigned to consume the good. The problem then boils down to
a characterization of the eÆcient and strategy-proof rules where size preferences do not
matter and a peak of some agent is always picked. Following Moulin (1980) (and see
Barbera and Jackson (1994) for details), this is easily seen to be the class of sovereign
generalized median rules.
Proof of Theorem 7:
We rst dene the following utility function. For any c 2 [0; 1] and i 2 N let ~u
c
i
be
such that p (~u
c
i
) = c and
1) jSj > jS
0
j with i 2 S \ S
0
) ~u
c
i
(x; S) > ~u
c
i
(y; S
0
) for all x; y 2 [0; 1].
2) ~u
c
i
(x; S) > 0 for all x 2 [0; 1] and for all S 2 2
N
with i 2 S.
The theorem follows from the two steps below.
Step 1: For all u 2 U
shar
, f (u) = (c; Y ) implies f (~u
c
) = (c; N).
If Y = N this follows easily, so consider the case where Y 6= N . Consider any
i 2 Y . By Lemma 16 we can assume that f(u) = (c; Y ) with p (u
i
) = c; and u is
such that for each i 2 Y : u
i
(x; S)  0 and i 2 S implies that x 2 I
i
(c) = I(c).
By Lemma 17 assume that for each j 6= Y; u
j
(x; S)  0 only if x 2 I
j
(p (u
j
)) and
S = N with I
j
p (u
j
) \ I
h
p (u
h
) = ; for any pair such that j =2 Y and h 6= j. Consider
j =2 Y and prole

u
0
j
; u
 j

with u
0
j
2 U
shar
j
such that p

u
0
j

= c; u
0
j
(x; S)  0 only
if x 2 I
0
j
(c)  I (c) and u
0
j
(c; fjg) > 0: If agent j =2 f
G

u
0
j
; u
 j

, then by outsider
23
Noting that j's most preferred allocation has positive utility, this interval must have a non-empty
interior.
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independence f

u
0
j
; u
 j

= (c; Y ) and individual stability is violated. Therefore by
strategy-proofness and individual stability f

u
0
j
; u
 j

= (z; (Y [ j)) with z 2 I
0
j
(c).
Since this must hold for any closed neighborhood of c, it follows f

u
0
j
; u
 j

= (c; (Y [ j)) :
Iterating for all agents i =2 (Y [ j) ; we obtain f (u
0
) = (c; N) : By strategy-proofness it
follows that f (~u
c
) = (c; N).
Step 2: Let f (u) = (c; Y ) and f ( _u) = (z;W ). We show that c = z.
By Step 1, f (~u
c
) = (c; N) and f (~u
z
) = (z;N) : Consider prole

u
z
1
; ~u
c
 1

where
p (u
z
1
) = z and u
z
1
(x; S)  0 only if x 2 I
1
(z) and such that c =2 I
1
(z) : If f
L

u
z
1
; ~u
c
 1

=2
I
1
(z) ; then by individual stability agent 1 =2 f
G

u
z
1
; ~u
c
 1

In this case strategy-proofness
is violated at some prole since f

u
z
1
; ~u
z
 1

= f (~u
z
) = (z;N) and, for all i 2 N;
~u
c
i
(z;N) > ~u
c
i
(x; S) for all S 6= N , for all x: Since f
L

u
z
1
; ~u
c
 1

2 I
1
(z) for all possible
neighborhoods of z; then by strategy-proofness it must be f

u
z
1
; ~u
c
 1

= (z;N) : Again by
strategy-proofness f

~u
z
1
; ~u
c
 1

= (z;N) and iterating for all i 6= n; f

~u
z
1
; :::; ~u
z
n 1
; ~u
c
n

=
f

~u
z
 n
; ~u
c
n

= (z;N) : Consider prole

~u
z
 n
; u
c
n

where p (u
c
n
) = c; u
c
n
(c; S) > 0 for all S,
and u
c
n
(x; S) < 0 if x =2 I
n
(c) with z =2 I
n
(c) : By the same argument, we conclude that
f

~u
z
 n
; u
c
n
;

= (c; N) and by strategy-proofness f

~u
z
 n
; ~u
c
n

= (c; N), which contradicts
our previous conclusion that f

~u
z
 n
; ~u
c
n

= (z;N).
Proof of Theorem 11: From Theorem 12 (proven below) we know that there is always
just one agent assigned to consume and the level must be that agent's peak. We need
only show that it must always be the same agent.
We rst state an obvious fact that follows directly from strategy-proofness.
Fact 1: Let f (u) = (p (u
i
) ; fig) for some i 2 I: Then f (u
i
; u
 i
) = (p (u
i
) ; fig) for all
u
i
2 U
cong
i
.
We now show that f (u) = (p (u
i
) ; fig) implies f (u) = (p (u
i
) ; fig) for all u 2 U
cong
:
Suppose the contrary. Without loss of generality, let f (u) = (p (u
1
) ; f1g) and
f (u) = (p (u
2
) ; f2g). By Fact 1 f (u
2
; u
 2
) 6= (p (u
2
) ; f2g), as otherwise it would have to
be that f(u) = (p (u
2
) ; f2g). By outsider independence, f (u
2
; u
 2
) = (p (u
1
) ; f1g) : Sim-
ilarly, f (u
2
; u
3
; u
 2;3
) 6= (p (u
3
) ; f3g) and so by outsider independence f (u
2
; u
3
; u
 2;3
) =
(p (u
1
) ; f1g) : Iterating this argument we reach the conclusion that f (u
1
; u
 1
) = (p (u
1
) ; f1g).
Therefore, by Fact 1 f (u) = (p (u
1
) ; f1g), which contradicts our supposition.
Proof of Theorem 12: We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas.
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Lemma 18 Let f : U
k
! [0; 1]  2
N
be strategy-proof, Pareto eÆcient and outsider
independent. Then for all u 2 U
k
, k 


f
G
(u)


.
Proof of Lemma 18: Suppose the contrary. Then we can nd u 2 U
k
such that
f (u) = (a; Y ) where jY j = q > k and q is the minimal cardinality of any group in the
range which is of size greater than k: Without loss of generality, assume Y = (1; :::; q).
By Lemma 16 we can assume, without loss of generality, that p (u
i
) = a, u
i
(a; Y ) > 0,
u
i
(x; S)  0 only if x 2 I
i
(p (u
i
)) = I (a), and q  jSj  k; for all i 2 Y . By Lemma
17 we assume that p (u
j
) 6= a, u
j
(x; S)  0 only if jSj = k, and x 2 I
j
(p (u
j
)) with
I
j
(p (u
j
)) \ I
h
(p (u
h
)) = ; for all h 6= j.
Let us assume that a 6= 1, as the case where a 6= 0 is analogous. For any i 2 Y , let
u
b
i
2 U
k
i
be such that
24
p

u
b
i

= b =2 I (a) ; such that there does not exist any j 6= i with
p (u
j
) 2 (a; b). Let u
b
i
be such that u
b
i
(x; S)  0 only if q  jSj  k and x 2 I
i
(b) = I(b);
with I (b) \ I
j
(p (u
j
)) = ; for all j =2 Y , and u
b
i
(a; Y ) > 0 (hence a is interior to I (b)).
Let us consider prole

u
b
1
; u
 1

. Since u
b
1
(f (u)) > 0;by strategy-proofness and the
conditions on preferences, it follows that 1 2 f
G

u
b
1
; u
 1

;


f
G

u
b
1
; u
 1



  k, and
f
L

u
b
1
; u
 1

= y 2 I (b). Suppose that either f
L

u
b
1
; u
 1

= y such that u
i
(y; Y ) < 0
for any i 2 Y , or


f
G

u
b
1
; u
 1



 < q: By eÆciency and the minimality of Y , it follows
that


f
G

u
b
1
; u
 1



 = k. Let u
00
1
be such that p (u
00
1
) = a, u
00
1
(x; S)  0 if and only
if jSj = k, i 2 S and x 2 I
00
1
(a); moreover let I
00
1
(a) be such that b 2 intI
00
1
(a) and
I
00
1
(a) \ I (p (u
j
)) = ; for all j 6= Y . If f

u
b
1
; u
 1

= (y; S
k
) with 1 2 f
G
(u
1
; u
 1
) ; then
by strategy-proofness, 1 2 f
G
(u
00
i
; u
 1
) and by eÆciency f (u
00
1
; u
 1
) = (a; S
k
). However,
then strategy-proofness is violated at prole u by agent 1. Thus, consider the case where
f
L

u
b
1
; u
 1

= y with u
i
(y; Y )  0 for all i 2 Y and


f
G

u
b
1
; u
 1



  q: By strategy-
proofness and the conditions on preferences it must be


f
G

u
b
1
; u
 1



 = q; hence by
eÆciency f
G

u
b
1
; u
 1

= Y . Suppose that y 6= a. Then consider _u
2
such that p ( _u
2
) = a
and _u
2
(x; S)  0 only if x 2
_
I
2
(a)  I (a) and q  jSj  k; with y =2
_
I
2
(a) and
_u
2
(a; Y ) > 0: By strategy-proofness f ( _u
2
; u
 2
) = (a; Y ). By the same reasoning as
before it follows that f

u
b
1
; _u
2
; u
 (1[2)

= (z; Y ) with z 2
_
I
2
(a) ; and strategy-proofness
is violated at prole

u
b
1
; u
 1

by agent 2 via _u
2
, since u
2
(y; Y ) < u
2
(z; Y ) :
So, it follows that f

u
b
1
; u
 1

= (a; Y ) : Repeating the same argument we conclude
that
f

u
b
1
; :::; u
b
q 1
; u
q
; :::; u
n

= (a; Y ) (1)
and by eÆciency
f

u
b
1
; :::; u
b
q 1
; u
b
q
; u
q+1
; :::; u
n

= (b; Y ) (2)
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The apex b species the agent i
0
s peak according to the new preferences. We write the apex when
the peak is dierent from the peak of the former preferences u
i
:
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From now on we x the utility functions of agents from q + 1 to n, and simplify
notation by writing only the rst q components of the utility proles.
Consider u^
q
such that p (u^
q
) = a; u^
q
(b; Y ) > 0, and u^
q
(x; S)  0 only if x 2
^
I
q
(a)
and q  jSj  k: Given (1), by strategy-proofness q 2 f
G

u
b
1
; :::u
b
q 1
; u^
q

:
Suppose that f
L

u
b
1
; :::u
b
q 1
; u^
q

= cwith c 6= a, c 2
^
I
q
(a) : Since f

u
b
1
; :::; u
b
q 1
; u
q

=
(a; Y ) ; then strategy-proofness implies q < f
G

u
b
1
; :::u
b
q 1
; u^
q

 k. By minimality
of Y; it follows


f
G

u
b
1
; :::u
b
q 1
; u^
q



 = k. Consider, then, _u
b
q
such that p

_u
b
q

= b;
and _u
b
q
(c; S
k
) > _u
b
q
(b; Y ). By eÆciency f

u
b
1
; :::u
b
q 1
; _u
b
q

= (b; S
k
) violating strategy-
proofness at prole f

u
b

. It follows that f
L

u
b
1
; :::u
b
q 1
; u^
q

= a: By strategy-
proofness, given (1), we have that
f

u
b
1
; :::u
b
q 1
; u^
q

= (a; Y ) : (3)
Consider ~u
b
1
such that p

~u
b
1

= b and ~u
b
1
(x; S)  0 only if x 2
~
I
1
(b) with a =2
~
I
1
(b),
and q  jSj  k. By strategy-proofness, (2) implies that
f

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
; :::; u
b
q

= (b; Y ) : (4)
Next, consider the prole

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q

: Since u^
q
(x; S)  0 only if q  jSj  k,
and u^
q
(b; Y ) > 0, strategy-proofness and (4) imply that agent q 2 f
G

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q

and q 


f
G

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q



  k: If f
L

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q

2
~
I
1
(b) then strategy-
proofness is violated at (3) by agent 1 via ~u
b
1
. Suppose, then, that f
L

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q

=2
~
I
1
(b). Pareto eÆciency implies that agent 1 =2 f
G

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q

and by the minimal-
ity of Y;


f
G

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q



 = k: EÆciency implies also that f
L

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q

=
c 2 [a; b). Consider u
b
q
such that p

u
b
q

= b; u
b
q
(c; S
k
) > 0, and u
b
q
(x; S) < 0 if jSj 6= k
or x =2 [a; b]. Given that q 2 f
G

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
; u^
q

, by strategy-proofness agent q 2
f
G

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
;u
b
q

, and


f
G

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
;u
b
q



 = k:By eÆciency f

~u
b
1
; u
b
2
:::; u
b
q 1
;u
b
q

=
(b; S
k
), but strategy-proofness is violated at prole (4) by agent q viau
b
q
. We have reached
a contradiction and so k  jY j.
Lemma 19 Let f : U
k
! [0; 1]2
N
be strategy-proof, eÆcient and outsider independent.
Then for all u 2 U
k
,


f
G
(u)


  k:
Proof of Lemma 19: Suppose the contrary. Let f (u) = (a; Y ) with jY j = q < k where
q is the maximal cardinality of any group in the range that is smaller than k: Without
loss of generality, assume that Y = (1; :::; q). Also, by Lemma 16 we can assume that all
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agents i 2 Y have the same preferences with p (u
i
) = a; u
i
(a; Y ) > 0 and u
i
(x; S)  0
only if x 2 I
i
(p (u
i
)) = I (a). Let I
k
(a) = fx 2 I (a) ju
i
(x; S
k
)  u
i
(a; Y ) foranyi 2 Y g.
By Lemma 17 we can assume that for all j =2 Y , p (u
j
) 6= a; u
j
(x; S)  0 only if jSj = k
and x 2 I
j
p (u
j
) with I
j
p (u
j
)\I
i
p (u
i
) = ; for all i 6= j. Finally, without loss of generality,
assume that p (u
q+1
) = b > a and there does not exist any agent i 2 N; i 6= q + 1 such
that p (u
i
) 2 (a; b] :
For any i 2 Y let u
0
i
be such that p (u
0
i
) = a; u
0
i
(x; S)  0 only if x 2 I
0
i
(a) = I
0
(a) with
I
0
(a) \ I
j
(p (u
j
)) = ; for all j  q + 2, and k  jSj  q, and u
0
i
(b; S
q+1
) > u
0
i
(a; Y ) : By
eÆciency and strategy-proofness f
G

u
0
1
; :::; u
0
q
; u
q+1
; :::; u
n

 f1; :::; q + 1g. Hence by the
assumption of the maximality of Y and strategy-proofness we have f (u
0
Y
; u
 Y
) = (x; S
k
)
with x =2 I
k
(a) : We x the preferences of agents q + 2 to n, and simplify notation by
only writing the rst q + 1 components of each preference prole. Let u
0
q+1
be such
that p

u
0
q+1

= b u
0
q+1
(x; S)  0 only if x 2 I
0
q+1
(b) ;with; I
0
q+1
(b) \ I
j
p (u
j
) = ; for
all j  q + 2, and k  jSj > q. Let also u
0
q+1
be such that u
0
q+1
(a; S
q+1
) > 0 (hence
a 2 intI
0
q+1
(b)). Then f

u
1
; :::u
q
; u
0
q+1

= (x; S
k
) with x 6= b: By strategy-proofness
it follows that f

u
1
; :::u
q
; u
0
q+1

= f

u
0
1
; :::u
0
q
; u
0
q+1

= f

u
0
1
; :::u
0
q
; u
q+1

= (c; S
k
) with
c 2 (a; b), c =2 I
k
(a).
For any i 2 Y , let ~u
i
be such that p (~u
i
) = a; ~u
i
(x; S)  0 only if x 2
~
I
i
(a) =
~
I (a)
with
~
I (a)  I
k
(a). Let u
i
be such that p (u
i
) = a; u
i
(a; Y ) > u
i
(b; S
k
) > 0 and
u
i
(x; S
k
) < 0 for all x =2

I
i
(a) =

I (a) with

I(a) \ I
j
(p (u
j
)) = ; for all j  q + 2: Let

I
k
(a) =
n
x 2

I (a) ju
i
(x; S
k
)  u
i
(a; Y ) foranyi 2 Y
o
. Let u
q+1
be such that p (u
q+1
) =
b; u
q+1
(b; fq + 1g) > u
q+1
(x; S
k
) for all x =2 [b  "; b+ "] with (b  ") =2

I
k
(a) ; and
u
q+1
(a; S
k
) > 0; and u
q+1
(x; S
k
) < 0 for all x =2

I
q+1
(b) with

I
q+1
(b) \ I
j
(p (u
j
)) = ; for
all j  q + 2.
First, consider prole

u
0
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

: Since u
q+1
(b; fq + 1g) > u
q+1
(a; S
k
) > 0 and
u
0
i
(b; S
q+1
) > 0 for all i 2 f1; :::; qg ; then by eÆciency f1; :::; q + 1g  f
G

u
0
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

:
Since f (u
0
) = (c; S
k
) then by strategy-proofness and by maximality of Y f

u
0
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

=
(c; S
k
) : Next, consider prole

~u
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

:
We argue that agent q + 1 2 f
G

~u
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

. Suppose not. Consider u
00
q+1
such
that p

u
00
q+1

= a and u
00
q+1
(x; S)  0 if and only if k  jSj  q and x 2 I
00
q+1
(a)  I (a) :
By outsider independence if agent q + 1 =2 f
G

u
1
; ::; u
q
; u
00
q+1

then f

u
1
; ::; u
q
; u
00
q+1

=
f (u) and eÆciency is violated. Therefore agent q + 1 2 f
G

u
1
; ::; u
q
; u
00
q+1

and by
strategy-proofness and the maximality of Y; f

u
1
; ::; u
q
; u
00
q+1

= (a; S
k
). It follows by
strategy-proofness that f

u
0
1
; ::; u
0
q
; u
00
q+1

= (a; S
k
) and, consequently f

~u
1
; u
0
2
::; u
0
q
; u
00
q+1

=
(a; S
k
). Since u
q+1
(a; S
k
) > 0; by strategy-proofness it follows that agent q + 1 2
f
G

~u
1
; u
0
2
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

.
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Now we argue that, f
L

~u
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

=2
~
I (a). In fact, if f
L

~u
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

2
~
I (a) then by eÆciency and the maximality of Y; it follows that


f
G

~u
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1



 = k
and strategy-proofness is violated by agent 1 at prole

u
0
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
q+1

via ~u
1
. Therefore
f
L

~u
1
; u
0
2
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

2

max
~
I (a) ;max

I
q+1
(b)
i
. Next, consider the prole

~u
1
; ~u
2
; u
0
3
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

.
If agent 2 =2 f
G

~u
1
; u
0
2
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

, then by outsider independence f

~u
1
; u
0
2
: : : ; u
0
q
; u
q+1

=
f

~u
1
; ~u
2
; u
0
3
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

. If agent 2 2 f
G

~u
1
; u
0
2
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

we may use the same argument
as given above to prove that agent q+1 2 f
G

~u
1
; ~u
2
; u
0
3
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

and f
L

~u
1
; ~u
2
::; u
0
q
; u
q+1

2

max
~
I (a) ;max

I
q+1
(b)
i
. Iterating this argument, we conclude that agent q + 1 2
f
G
(~u
1
; ~u
2
:::~u
q
; u
q+1
). Since at the allocation f (~u
1
; ~u
2
:::~u
q
; u
q+1
) the utility level of all
agents in f
G
(~u
1
; ~u
2
:::~u
q
; u
q+1
) is negative, except the utility level of agent q + 1; and
u
q+1
(b; fq + 1g) > 0; it follows that any eÆcient allocation provides f
L
(~u
1
; ~u
2
:::~u
q
; u
q+1
) 2
[b  "; b+ "] : Let ~u
q+1
be such that p (~u
q+1
) = b; ~u
q+1
(x; S)  0 only if x 2
~
I
q+1
(b) =
~
I (b), with c =2
~
I (b) ;and ~u
q+1
(x; fq + 1g) > 0 for all x 2 [b  "; b+ "] : Moreover let
~u
q+1
be such that for any x < y < b (x > y > b) ~u
q+1
(x; S)  ~u
q+1
(y; S
0
) implies
u
q+1
(x; S) > u
q+1
(y; S
0
). By strategy-proofness
f
L
(~u) 2 [b  "; b+ "] (5)
Consider now the prole f

u
1
; u
0
2
; :::; u
0
q+1

. As we previously showed f

u
0
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
0
q+1

=
(c; S
k
). Given that u
1
(c; S
k
) > 0, it follows from strategy-proofness that agent 1 2
f
G

u
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
0
q+1

: Since u
0
q+1
(b; S
q+1
) > 0, it follows from strategy-proofness and the
maximality of Y that f

u
1
; u
0
2
:::u
0
q
; u
0
q+1

= (c; S
k
) : Iterating the same argument we
conclude that f

u
1
; :::u
q
; u
0
q+1

= (c; S
k
). Now change agent q + 1's preferences to ~u
q+1
:
By eÆciency and the maximality of Y; if f
L
(u
1
; :::u
q
; ~u
q+1
) 2
~
I(b); since u
i
(b; S
k
) > 0
for all i 2 Y;then f
G
j(u
1
; :::u
q
; ~u
q+1
)j = k and strategy-proofness is violated at pro-
le

u
1
; :::u
q
; u
0
q+1

by agent q + 1 via ~u
q+1
. Therefore f
L
(u
1
; :::u
q
; ~u
q+1
) =2
~
I(b) and
~u
q+1
(f (u
1
; :::u
q
; ~u
q+1
)) < 0: Since u
i
(a; Y ) > u
i
(b; S
k
) for all i 2 Y; by eÆciency,
f
L
(u
1
; :::u
q
; ~u
q+1
) 2 I
k
(a) and by strategy-proofness agent q+1 =2 f
G
(u
1
; :::u
q
; ~u
q+1
), oth-
erwhise he would announce u
0
q+1
. It follows from strategy-proofness that f (~u
1
; :::~u
q
; ~u
q+1
) =
(a; S) with q + 1 =2 S; which contradicts the previous conclusion in equation (5).
Lemma 20 Let f : U
k
! [0; 1]2
N
be strategy-proof, eÆcient and outsider independent.
Then for each u 2 U
k
, there exists some i 2 f
G
(u) with p (u
i
) = f
L
(u).
Proof of Lemma 20: Suppose the contrary for some u, and let f (u) = (b; Y ), with
p (u
i
) 6= b for all i 2 Y . Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 17, we
assume without loss of generality that p (u
j
) 6= b for all j =2 Y . From now on we do not
specify the cardinality of the assigned group since we have already proven that it must
be k at all u 2 U
k
. The following claim is useful.
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Claim: If f (u) = (a; S) ; with i 2 S and p (u
i
) < a, then for all x 2 (p (u
i
) ; a) there
exists u
0
i
such that p (u
0
i
) = x and f (u
0
i
; u
 i
) = (a; S
0
) with i 2 S
0
(and the same holds
for the case where p (u
i
) > a).
Proof of the Claim: Consider, in fact, any u
00
i
such that p (u
00
i
) = x with x 2
(p (u
i
) ; a) ; and u
00
i
(a; S) > 0. By strategy-proofness it follows that i 2 f
G
(u
00
i
; u
 i
).
Then f
L
(u
00
i
; u
 i
) 6= a implies by strategy-proofness f
L
(u
00
i
; u
 i
) = y with y < p (u
i
)
and u
00
i
(y; S)  u
00
i
(a; S) : Consider then u
0
i
such that p (u
0
i
) = p (u
00
i
), u
0
i
(a; S) > 0; but
u
0
i
(y; S) < 0: Then by strategy-proofness f (u
0
i
; u
 i
) = (a; S
0
) with i 2 S
0
.
Suppose that Y = f1; :::; kg ; and by the claim that p (u
1
) = :::p (u
q
) = a < b,
p (u
q+1
) = ::: = p (u
k
) = c > b; and for all j =2 Y; p (u
j
) =2 [a; c] : Let A = f1; :::; qg
and C = fq + 1; :::; kg :let assume that for all i 2 A (C) u
i
(x; S)  0 only if x 2
I
i
(p (u
i
)) = I(a) (= I(c)) such that [a; c]  I
i
(p (u
i
)) ; while for all j =2 Y; u
j
(x; S)  0
only if x 2 I
j
(p (u
j
)) and jSj = k; with I
j
(p (u
j
)) \ I
i
(p (u
i
)) = ; for any pair such that
j =2 Y; i 2 N: . Consider any i 2 Y: Let u
i
be such that p (u
i
) = p (u
i
) and u
i
(x; S)  0
only if x 2

I
i
(p (u
i
)), where

I
i
(p (u
i
))  I
i
(p (u
i
)) ; b =2

I
i
(p (u
i
)) and such that for all
x 2

I
i
(p (u
i
)) u
i
(x; S) > u
i
(b; S): Consider preference prole (u
1
; u
 1
) : By eÆciency if
f
L
((u
1
; u
 1
)) = x for any x 2

I
i
(p (u
i
)), then f
G
((u
1
; u
 1
)) = Y; which violates strategy-
proofness at prole u. So, consider the following remaining cases. We show that each
cannot hold.
CASE 1: f (u
1
; u
 1
) = (y; S
0
) with y < a or y > max I(c).
Consider any i 2 C: Let u
0
i
be such that p (u
0
i
) = a and u
0
i
(x; S)  0 with i 2 S only
if x 2 I(a) with u
0
i
(b; Y ) > 0. By strategy-proofness and eÆciency f (u
0
C
; u
 C
) = (a; Y ).
By strategy-proofness f

u
1
; u
0
C
; u
 (C[1)

= (a; Y ) : Therefore since u
i
(y; S
0
) < u
i
(a; Y )
for all i 2 C; strategy-proofness is violated at some utility prole.
CASE 2: f (u
1
; u
 1
) = (y; S
0
) with y 2

max

I
1
(a); b

.
Agent 1 =2 S
0
, otherwhise strategy-proofness is violated at prole u by agent 1 via u
1
.
Consider then u
0
1
such that p (u
0
1
) = d with a < d < y and u
0
1
(x; S
0
)  0 if and only if
agent x 2 [a; y] with 1 2 S
0
: By outsider independence if agent 1 =2 f (u
0
1
; u
 1
), then
f (u
0
1
; u
 1
) = f (u
1
; u
 1
) and eÆciency is violated. Therefore agent 1 2 f (u
0
1
; u
 1
) and
f
L
(u
0
1
; u
 1
) 2 [a; y] and strategy-proofness is violated at prole u by agent 1 via u
0
1
.
CASE 3: f (u
1
; u
 1
) = (y; S
0
) with y 2 [b;max I (c)] :
By eÆciency C  S
0
: Change one by one preferences of all agents i 2 A: Then
f (u
A
; u
 A
) = (z; S
00
) with z 2 [b;max I (c)], otherwise Case 1 or 2 above apply at some
prole. By eÆciency C  S
00
. Suppose that z 6= c. For i 2 C, nd preferences such that
p (u
0
i
) = c, u
0
i
(z; S) > 0 but u
0
i
(c; S
k q
) > u
0
i
(z; S) : By eÆciency f
L

u
A
; u
0
C
; u
 (A[C)

= c
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with C  f
G

u
A
; u
0
C
; u
 (A[C)

; since the outcome (c; C) Pareto dominates (z; S
00
) : It fol-
lows that strategy-proofness is violated at some prole, since


f
G

u
A
; u
0
C
; u
 (A[C)



 = k
by Lemmas 18 and 19. Therefore f (u
A
; u
 A
) = (c; S
00
) with C  S
00
and by strate-
gyproofness f

u
A[C
; u
 (A[C)

= (c; S
00
).
A similar argument, starting looking at prole (u
k
; u
 k
) provides that f

u
A[C
; u
 (A[C)

=
(a; S) reaching a contradiction.
Lemma 21 Let f : U
k
! [0; 1]2
N
be strategy-proof, eÆcient and outsider independent.
If u 2 U
k
and u
0
2 U
k
are such that p(u
i
) = p(u
0
i
) for all i, then f
L
(u) = f
L
(u
0
).
Proof of Lemma 21: From the previous lemmas, we know that f picks the peak of
some agent and selects a group of size k. This is taken as given in the proof that follows.
Let
b
U
k
 U
k
be the set of proles for which 0 6= u
i
(p(u
j
); S) 6= u
i
(p(u
i
); S) whenever
i 2 S and j 6= i.
We establish the Lemma in the following steps.
Step 1: If u 2
b
U
k
and
e
u
i
= u
i
+M for some large M (so that
e
u
i
(x; S) > 0 for any x
whenever i 2 S), then f
L
(
e
u) = f
L
(u).
Let f(
e
u) = (a; S). By strategy-proofness and outsider independence it follows that
f(
e
u
S
; u
 S
) = (a; S). Consider j 2 S. Let us show that f
L
(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
) = a. Iterating the
same logic then establishes Step 1. First consider the case where u
j
(a; S) > 0. It follows
from strategy-proofness that j 2 f
G
(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
). Given that on
b
U
k
u
j
is not indierent
over any of the peaks of the agents, that f
L
picks a peak, and that u
j
and
e
u
j
have the
same ranking of levels, it follows from strategy-proofness that f
L
(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
) = a. Next,
consider the case where 0  u
j
(a; S). Find i such that a = p(
e
u
i
) = p(u
i
). For any
" > 0, dene
b
u
e
i
to be a shift of
e
u
i
where p(
b
u
e
i
) = (1   ")p(
e
u
i
) + "p(u
j
). It follows from
strategy-proofness, the fact that f
L
picks a peak, and the continuity of
b
u
e
i
that for small
enough " (and taking it so that the peak does not overlap with another peak)
f
L
(
b
u
e
i
;
e
u
Sni
; u
 S
) = p(
b
u
e
i
): (6)
Dene
b
u
e
j
so that the ranking over levels is the same as under
e
u
j
, but so that
b
u
e
j
(a; S) < 0
and
b
u
j
(p(
b
u
e
i
)) > 0. Then it follows that
f
L
(
b
u
e
i
;
b
u
e
j
;
e
u
Sni;j
; u
 S
) = p(
b
u
e
i
): (7)
This follows from strategy-proofness and (6) if j 2 f
L
(
b
u
e
i
;
e
u
Sni
; u
 S
), and from outsider
independence and strategy-proofness otherwise. Then it must be by strategy-proofness
(via agent i), (7), and the fact that f
L
picks a peak, that for small enough "
f
L
(
b
u
e
j
;
e
u
Snj
; u
 S
) = a: (8)
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Then if j 2 f
G
(
b
u
e
j
;
e
u
Snj
; u
 S
) it must be by strategy-proofness (and the fact that
b
u
e
j
and
u
j
have the same ranking over levels) that f
L
(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
) = a. So consider the case
where j =2 f
G
(
b
u
e
j
;
e
u
Snj
; u
 S
). If also, j =2 f
G
(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
), then outsider independence
establishes the conclusion of the step. If j 2 f
G
(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
), then if f
L
(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
) 6= a,
then it must be that u
j
(f(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
)) > 0, which implies that
b
u
e
j
(f(
e
u
Snj
; u
 S[j
)) > 0
for small ", which contradicts strategy-proofness and (8).
Step 2: If u 2
b
U
k
and u
0
2
b
U
k
are such that p(u
i
) = p(u
0
i
) for all i, then f
L
(u) = f
L
(u
0
).
From step 1, we can concentrate on the case where u
i
(x; S) > 0 for all x when
i 2 S and similarly for u
0
i
. Let f(u) = (a; S), where a = p(u
i
). By strategy-proofness
and outsider independence it follows that f(u
S
; u
0
 S
) = (a; S). It then easily follows
that f
L
(u
Sni
; u
0
 S[i
) = a. Next, change u
j
to u
0
j
for some j 2 S n i. Let us show
that the outcome must still be a. Then iteration of this argument for further agents in
S establishes the step. Suppose to the contrary that f
L
(u
Sni;j
; u
0
 S[i;j
) = b 6= a. By
outsider independence, it must be that j 2 f
G
(u
Sni
; u
0
 S[i
) or f
G
(u
Sni;j
; u
0
 S[i;j
), and so
by strategy-proofness j must be in both groups. Also by strategy-proofness, it must be
that b 6= p(u
j
) = p(u
0
j
) 6= a. In particular, it follows from strategy-proofness that b
must lie on one side of p(u
j
) and a on the other side. For any " > 0, consider u
"
j
with
p(u
"
j
) = p(u
j
) and such that u
"
j
(b) > u
"
j
(a), but u
"
j
((1   ")a + "b) > u
"
j
(b), and where
u
"
j
(x; T ) > 0 whenever j 2 T . It follows from strategy-proofness that
f
L
(u
"
j
; u
Sni;j
; u
0
 S[i
) = b: (9)
Let u
"
i
be such that p(u
"
i
) = (1   ")a + "b and u
"
i
(x; T ) > 0 whenever i 2 T , and such
that u
"
i
(a) > u
"
i
(b),
25
but any peak of some other agent h 6= i that lies on the opposite
side of a from b is worse than b under u
"
i
. For small ", since f
L
(u
S
; u
0
 S
) = a, then by
strategy-proofness, continuity of preferences and the fact that f
L
always picks a peak of
an agent, it follows that
f
L
(u
"
i
; u
Sni
; u
0
 S
) = (1  ")a+ "b; (10)
and that i 2 f
G
(u
"
i
; u
Sni
; u
0
 S
). By strategy-proofness (for i) and outsider independence,
and (9) it follows that
f
L
(u
"
i
; u
"
j
; u
Sni;j
; u
0
 S
) = b: (11)
[Under strategy-proofness, the only possibility is to change to the other side of a but then
it would have to be the peak of some other agent which is worse for i than b.] However,
now (10) and (11) contradict strategy-proofness for j via a manipulation at u
"
j
.
Step 3: If u 2 U
k
and u
0
2 U
k
are such that p(u
i
) = p(u
0
i
) for all i, then f
L
(u) = f
L
(u
0
).
The proof of this step follows from nding u
"
2
b
U
k
arbitrarily \close" to u and
u
"
0
2
b
U
k
arbitrarily \close" to u
0
such that the peaks of u
"
and u
"
0
coincide. From Step
25
Since we have established that the size of the group must be xed at k, we write the utility function
as a function of the location; denoting the utility that would be obtained if i were in the group of size k.
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2 we know that f
L
(u
"
) = f
L
(u
"
0
). Showing that careful selection of these proles leads
to outcomes arbitrarily close to f
L
(u) and f
L
(u
0
), respectively, provides the result.
Consider any " > 0. We identify u
"
i
inductively on the agents. First consider agent
1. If 1 =2 f
G
(u) nd u
"
1
such that u
"
1
has a strict ranking over the (distinct) peaks of
other agents, max
x;S
ju
1
(x; S)   u
"
1
(x; S)j < ", and u
"
1
(x; S) < u
1
(x; S) whenever 1 2
S. It follows from outsider independence that f(u
 1
; u
"
1
) = f(u). If 1 2 f
G
(u), then
nd u
"
1
such that u
"
1
has a strict ranking over the (distinct) peaks of the other agents,
max
x;S
ju
1
(x; S)   u
"
1
(x; S)j < ", and fxju
"
1
(x; f
G
(u)) > u
"
1
(f(u))g is a strict subset of
fxju
1
(x; f
G
(u)) > u
"
1
(f(u))g, and u
"
1
(f(u)) > 0 if u
1
(f(u))  0. By strategy-proofness,
it must be that 1 2 f
G
(u
 1
; u
"
1
). Then the fact that fxju
"
1
(x; f
G
(u)) > u
"
1
(f(u))g is a
strict subset of fxju
1
(x; f
G
(u)) > u
"
1
(f(u))g and strategy-proofness imply that either
f
L
(u
 1
; u
"
1
) = f
L
(u) or that f
L
(u
 1
; u
"
1
) is arbitrarily near f
L
(u) for small enough ", (as
if it is not the rst case then it must have been that f
L
(u) = p(u
1
)).
Then inducting and making similar changes for i > 1 (taking care when changing i's
peak not to induce indierence over peaks for any j < i) provides that f
L
(u
"
) can be
made arbitrarily close to f
L
(u). When selecting u
"
0
, choose it to coincide with the peaks
of u
"
.
The Lemmas above establish Theorem 12.
Proof of Theorem 14: We show that any individually stable rule cannot be strategy-
proof. Let S
q
denote any group with cardinality equal to q: Let u 2 U
k
with k < n be
such that for all i 2 N
 u
i
(x; S) > 0 for all x 2 [0; 1] and for all S such that jSj  k; with i 2 S, and
 u
i
(x; S
0
) < 0 for all x 2 [0; 1] and for all S
0
such that jS
0
j > k; with i 2 S
0
:
By individual stability f (u) = (y; S
k
) for some y 2 [0; 1]. Hence, since by assumption
k < n, there exists an agent i =2 S
k
. Consider ~u
i
2 U
k
i
such that ~u
i
(x; S
k+1
) > 0 for
all x 2 [0; 1]. By individual stability f (~u
i
; u
 i
) =

z;

S
k

with i 2

S
k
. It follows that
strategy-proofness is violated at f (u) by agent i who can manipulate via ~u
i
.
Proof of Theorem 15: The theorem follows from the lemmas below.
Lemma 22 Consider S  N and let f : U
k
S
 U
k
0
NnS
! [0; 1]  2
N
be strategy-proof,
eÆcient and outsider independent. (So the domain is one where agents in S always
prefer size k and agents in N n S prefer size k
0
.) The f
G
must have a constant size
of k or a constant size of k
0
. Also, for any u and u
0
, if p(u
i
) = p(u
0
i
) for all i, then
f
L
(u) = f
L
(u
0
).
Proof of Lemma 22: The facts that f
L
(u) = f
L
(u
0
) and f
G
must be of a constant size
follow from arguments that are similar to those in the proof of Theorem 12. The fact
that the size of f
G
must be either k or k
0
follows from Pareto eÆciency.
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Lemma 23 Let f : U
k;k
0
! [0; 1]  2
N
be strategy-proof, eÆcient and outsider in-
dependent. Then for any u 2 U
k;k
0
and u
0
2 U
k;k
0
, if p(u
i
) = p(u
0
i
) for all j, then
f
L
(u) = f
L
(u
0
).
Proof of Lemma 23:The proof is by induction on the agents. First consider agent
i who may have preference in U
k;k
0
i
while all other agents have u
j
2 U
k
j
. Suppose to
the contrary that f
L
(u) = a 6= b = f
L
(u
0
i
; u
 i
) for some u 2 U
k
and u
0
i
2 U
k
0
i
with
p(u
i
) = p(u
0
i
). By Lemma 22, we can assume that i prefers to be in any group at any
level and size under both preferences, that either i prefers a at size k or k
0
to b at size
k or k
0
, or vice versa (in the case where b = p(u
i
)). By strategy-proofness it follows
that either i 2 f
G
(u) \ f
G
(u
0
i
; u
 i
), or that i =2 f
G
(u) [ f
G
(u
0
i
; u
 i
). The second case
would violate outsider independence, so it must be the rst case. But then this violates
strategy- proofness. Iterating on the agents provides the result.
Lemma 24 Let f : U
k
[ U
k
0
! [0; 1]  2
N
be strategy-proof, eÆcient and outsider
independent. Then for any u 2 U
k
[ U
k
0
there exists i such that f(u) = (p(u
i
); S) with
i 2 S and jSj is of i's favorite size.
Proof of Lemma 24: Suppose the contrary. Without loss of generality let f(u) = (a; S),
where jSj = k, while any agent i 2 S who has p(u
i
) = a (if any) has favorite size k
0
.
For j =2 S consider ~u
j
such that p(~u
j
) 6= a, maintaining the ordering over peaks of
the other agents (and varied sizes of groups) as under u
j
and such that u
j
(x; T ) < 0
implies ~u
j
(x; T )  0. It follows from strategy-proofness and outsider independence that
f(u
S
; ~u
 S
) = (a; S). For j =2 S consider u
0
j
such that p(u
0
j
) = p(~u
j
) and u
0
j
(x; T ) < 0 for
all x =2 I
j

p(u
0
j
)

with a =2 I
j

p(u
0
j
)

: It follows from strategy-proofness and outsider
independence that f(u
S
; u
0
 S
) = (a; S). Next for each i 2 S; consider u
0
i
such that i has
the same ranking over all choices where i is a consumer as under u
i
, but has u
0
i
(a; S) < 0.
It follows from Lemma 22 that f(u
0
) = (a; S
0
) where jS
0
j = k. However, this is ineÆcient
since it is Pareto dominated by (a; ;), which is a contradiction.
Lemma 25 Let f : U
k
[ U
k
0
! [0; 1]  2
N
be strategy-proof, eÆcient and outsider
independent. Then f is dictatorial.
Proof of Lemma 25: Consider u 2 U
k
[ U
k
0
such that all peaks are distinct. Then by
Lemma 24, f(u) = (p(u
i
); S) where i 2 S, and S is of i's favorite size, which without loss
of generality let be k. Change u
 i
to u
0
 i
with the same peaks, and all with favorite size
k
0
. By Lemma 23, f
L
(u) = f
L
(u
i
; u
0
 i
), and then by Lemma 24 it must be (p(u
i
); S
0
) with
i 2 S
0
, but still jS
0
j = k. We know from Theorem 12 that f
L
must be determined by a
sovereign median rule which always picks a peak of one agent. So consider any j such that
there are no peaks of any agent between u
0
j
and u
i
. Without loss of generality consider
the case where p(u
0
j
) < p(u
i
). Let u
"
i
2 U
k+
i
be such that p(u
e
i
) = max[0; p(u
0
j
)   "] and
u
e
i
(z; T ) > u
e
i
(y; T
0
) whenever i 2 T and jT j = k and jT
0
j = k
0
regardless of z and y. Since
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this is a generalized median rule, for small enough " either f
L
(u) = p(u
e
i
) or = p(u
0
j
).
By strategy-proofness, it must be that jf
G
(u
e
i
; u
0
 i
)j = k. Thus, by Lemma 24 it must be
that f
L
(u
e
i
; u
0
 i
) = p(u
e
i
). It is then clear that f must be dictatorial on the domain where
all agents other than i have distinct peaks. Strategy-proofness then easily shows that it
must be dictatorial on U
k
[ U
k
0
.
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